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Clear Standards, for Discovery Protective Orders:
A Missed Opportunity in Rhinehart v. Seattle
Times Co.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Washington State Supreme Court faced the conflict in
values between liberal discovery rules and the first amendment
for the first time in Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co.1 The appeal
by the Seattle Times raised the issue of whether protective
orders restricting the dissemination of discovery materials vio-
late free speech interests and constitutional guarantees of public
access to judicial proceedings.' The Washington Supreme
Court's response failed to create meaningful policy guidelines for
future cases. The majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions
each suggested a different way to analyze protective orders. The
majority refused to recognize first amendment interests in pre-
trial discovery orders, but phrased its refusal so ambiguously
that the status of first amendment interests in protective orders
was left uncertain.
The United States Supreme Court partially resolved the
confusion when it considered the validity of the Rhinehart pro-
tective order on appeal. The Court affirmed the state supreme
court, but disagreed with the state court's rationale in one
important respect. The Court did find limited first amendment
interests affected by the protective order request.$ Despite its
acknowledgment of first amendment interests, the Supreme
Court joined the Washington court in declining to formulate a
clearly defined balancing test for trial courts to use in issuing
protective orders,4 and thus failed to ensure that limitations on
first amendment freedoms would be no greater than necessary to
1. 98 Wash. 2d 226, 654 P.2d 673 (1982), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 2199 (1984).
2. Id. at 229, 654 P.2d at 676.
3. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2208 (1984).
4. Id. at 2206.
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prevent abuses of pretrial discovery.
This Comment examines the Rhinehart litigation and sug-
gests balancing guidelines that the courts, in particular the
Washington Supreme Court,0 could have proposed as standards.
Several federal circuit courts have developed clear balancing cri-
teria for trial courts to use in issuing protective orders.' Wash-
ington courts had not considered the scope of first amendment
interests in discovery before Rhinehart, but they had issued bal-
ancing standards for protecting such interests in the context of
other judicial proceedings.7 The Rhinehart court could have pro-
duced clearer guidelines for evaluating protective orders by care-
fully considering the relevant federal cases as well as the free
speech8 and open judicial proceedings provisions of the Wash-
ington State Constitution, and the state's Public Disclosure
Act.10
Both state and federal cases are relevant to the Rhinehart
decision because discovery proceedings in Washington are gov-
erned by Superior Court Civil Rule 26 (CR 26), which is based
on rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." CR 26 con-
tains the central provisions governing the scope of discovery.12
CR 26(c) authorizes superior courts to restrict a litigant's broad
rights to information during discovery." The rule also provides
5. References to the Rhinehart court and the Rhinehart decision, unless otherwise
noted, are to the Washington State Supreme Court and to the state court's decision.
6. See, e.g., San Juan Star Co. v. Barcelo, 662 F.2d 108, 116 (1st Cir. 1981); In re
Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
7. See infra note 138.
8. WASH. CoNsT. art. I, § 5: "Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right."
9. WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 10: "Justice in all cases shall be administered openly, and
without unnecessary delay."
10. WASH. Rev. CODE ch. 42.17 (1983). Chapter 42.17 governs disclosure of campaign
financing, lobbyist reporting, and public records. This Comment examines only public
records disclosure as governed by WASH. REv. CODE §§ 42.17.250 -.340 (1983).
11. Rhinehart, 98 Wash. 2d at 231, 654 P.2d at 676.
12. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MULm, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CIVIL § 2001, at
15 (1970) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLm].
13. WASH. SUPER. CT. C.R. 26(c) is identical in substance to the text of FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(c) and reads as follows:
(c) Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from
whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the
action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court
in the county where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which
justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the follow-
ing: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be had only
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that upon "good cause shown," a court may make "any order
which justice requires to protect a party from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." 4
However, protective orders, originally intended as remedies for
abuse, may be abuses in their own right. Some commentators
claim that the good cause standard is too easily met, and that it
allows unnecessary restrictions on the dissemination of discovery
information."'
The Seattle Times challenged the good cause standard in
Rhinehart. The Times charged that CR 26(c) unconstitutionally
infringed on its first amendment rights by permitting a court,
upon a mere showing of good cause, to limit the use to which the
press could put pretrial discovery information.' 6 The Washing-
ton Supreme Court did not wholeheartedly endorse the good
cause standard, but it did reject the Times' first amendment
arguments. The Rhinehart majority concluded that interests in
privacy and judicial administration override competing constitu-
tional concerns when a protective order is at issue.' 7
on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place;
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than
that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be
inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters;
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated
by the court; (6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order
of the court; (7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development,
or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated
way; (8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or informa-
tion enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court
may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person
provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the
award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.
WASH. SUPER. CT. C.R. 26(c).
14. Id.
15. A typical criticism is found in Note, Rule 26(c) Protective Orders and the First
Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1645, 1666 (1980) (good cause standard should be
replaced by a balancing test because "good cause" does not adequately protect the first
amendment interests in disseminating discovery information). Some courts have read
specific considerations into the good cause standard. See, e.g., San Juan Star Co. v.
Barcelo, 662 F.2d 108, 116 (1st Cir. 1981) (good cause standard should incorporate
heightened sensitivity to first amendment concerns); In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 193
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (in determining whether good cause exists, trial court must also require
a specific showing that dissemination of discovery information would pose a concrete
threat to an important countervailing interest).
16. 98 Wash. 2d at 229, 654 P.2d at 676.
17. The majority thus proposed a limited balancing test whereby the trial court
would weigh the interests of both parties. Id. at 256, 654 P.2d at 690. The court added,
however, that the judge's major concern should be the facilitation of the discovery pro-
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The Washington State Supreme Court has previously bal-
anced the interests of privacy and effective judicial administra-
tion against those of free speech and public access in the context
of judicial proceedings,18 and the court missed a significant
opportunity to expand and apply this balancing test in
Rhinehart. The United States Supreme Court similarly declined
to create a balancing test to ensure the full protection of first
amendment interests during pretrial discovery. A need remains
for a general standard to ensure that first amendment interests
in disseminating discovery information are identified and pro-
tected when a protective order is requested.
II. Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co.: AN OVERVIEW
Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co. developed from charges of
defamation and invasion of privacy filed by Keith Rhinehart
against the Seattle Times and the Walla Walla Union-Bulletin. 19
Both newspapers had published several articles about Rhinehart
and the Aquarian Foundation, a religious sect founded and led
by Rhinehart. After Rhinehart sued on behalf of himself and the
foundation, the defendants conducted discovery regarding the
plaintiffs' financial affairs, membership, and donors. The plain-
tiffs supplied some financial materials, but refused to divulge
other information in an attempt to forestall unwanted
publicity.20
The defendants sought and were granted an order compel-
ling discovery, and the plaintiffs obtained a protective order
restricting the use of the acquired information.2 ' The protective
order stated that "information gained by a defendant through
the discovery process may not be published by any of the defen-
dants or made available to any news media for publication or
dissemination. '22 The newspapers attacked the protective order
on the ground that it denied them freedom of the press and free-
dom of speech guarahteed by the first amendment of the United
States Constitution and by article I, section 5 of the Washington
Constitution. The trial court's memorandum opinion stated that
the plaintiffs had reasonable grounds for requesting and receiv-
cess, which involves a consideration of the privacy interests of the parties. Id.
18. See, e.g., infra notes 141-48 and accompanying text.
19. 98 Wash. 2d at 227, 654 P.2d at 675.
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ing a protective order. 23 The trial court feared a "chilling" effect
on a party's willingness to sue if such orders could not be
issued. 4 The judge found access to the courts to be as important
as freedom of the press "because it is through the courts that
our fundamental freedoms are protected and enforced. ' '25
A majority of the supreme court upheld the protective order
and concluded, contrary to the trend in the federal circuits, that
the good cause standard provided a sufficient framework within
which to evaluate a CR 26(c) protective order.2 Most of Justice
Rosellini's opinion, however, was devoted to demonstrating that
the order could meet the heavy burden of justification required
of a prior restraint.2 7 The majority never expressly concluded
that meeting the good cause standard alone was sufficient to val-
idate a protective order. Justice Dolliver's concurrence
addressed the majority's uncertainty, declaring that the court
"should state categorically that discovery under the standards of
CR 26(c) and the protective orders of the court in this case do
not require a First Amendment analysis. ' 28 Such a categorical
statement would enable the court to avoid "the morass of rather
tendentious First Amendment commentary" afflicting federal
court decisions regarding 26(c) orders.2
23. Id. at 228-29, 654 P.2d at 675.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 256, 654 P.2d at 690. Justices Stafford, Williams, and Dore concurred with
Justice Rosellini's majority opinion. Id. at 258, 654 P.2d at 691. Chief Justice
Brachtenbach concurred with the majority and with Justice Dolliver's concurring opin-
ion. Id. at 258, 261, 654 P.2d at 691, 692. Justice Dimmick concurred with Justice Dol-
liver's concurrence. Id. at 261, 654 P.2d at 692. Justice Pearson joined Justice Utter's
dissent. Id. at 275, 654 P.2d at 700. See supra note 6 for cases that have expanded the
traditional scope of good cause.
27. 98 Wash. 2d at 256, 654 P.2d at 690. A prior restraint is any type of predeter-
mined prohibition to restrain certain specified information. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stu-
art, 427 U.S. 539, 556 (1976). The Supreme Court has held that prior restraints on
speech and publication are the most serious and least tolerable infringement of first
amendment freedoms. Id. at 559. A few courts have stated that protective orders limiting
the dissemination of discovery materials are prior restraints. See, e.g., Reliance Ins. Co.
v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("Defendants contend correctly that if
this Court grants the protective order sought by plaintiff, it would, in effect, be ordering
a 'prior restraint' of the freedom of the press .. "); Georgia Gazette Publishing Co. v.
Ramsey, 248 Ga. 528, 530, 284 S.E.2d 386, 387 (1981) ("(W]e find the restraining order
. . . to be an unwarranted restraint upon the newspaper's liberty of speech and of the
press."). A prior restraint may be constitutional, but the party seeking it "carries a heavy
burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint." Organization for a
Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
28. 98 Wash. 2d at 258, 654 P.2d at 691 (Dolliver, J., concurring).
29. Id.
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The dissenting opinion suggested clarification of Rhinehart
in the opposite direction, faulting the majority for exempting
discovery from first amendment scrutiny.30 Though courts were
split regarding the proper balancing standard to apply,3 1 Justice
Utter stated that competing concerns could be evaluated if sev-
eral factors were weighed: the extent of the first amendment
interest enjoined by the order; the harm threatened by failing to
issue a protective order; the status of the parties seeking an
order and against whom the order is sought; and the court's spe-
cific concerns in issuing protective orders.3 2
Justice Utter criticized the Rhinehart order because the
order was issued without consideration of first amendment inter-
ests and because it was overly broad.33 According to Justice
Utter, the trial court's concern about a hypothetical chilling
effect meant that the rationale for the order lacked important
specifics.3 " The trial court also failed to state what discovery
information was restrained or for how long the restraint would
last.35 The dissent did not conclude that issuance of the order
was in error, but urged a remand so that the trial judge could
undertake a balancing test. "A specific harm has not been iden-
tified by the trial court, First Amendment interests are given no
recognition, and the order does not reflect the narrowness which
derives from a concern for such interests."3 6 Justice Utter there-
fore attempted to fill the void he saw created by the majority
opinion:
By failing to apply in earnest the traditionally stringent stan-
dards of prior restraint, the majority both dilutes the future
30. Id. at 261, 654 P.2d at 692 (Utter, J., dissenting) ("While purporting to apply
the doctrine of prior restraint to this case, the majority's ruling for all practical purposes
makes discovery a category exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.").
31. Justice Utter cited many cases and law review articles that are helpful in setting
forth the protective order controversy. Id. at 264, 654 P.2d at 694. See also Dore, Confi-
dentiality Orders-The Proper Role of the Courts in Providing Confidential Treatment
for Information Disclosed Through the Pre-Trial Discovery Process, 14 N. ENG. L. REV.
1 (1978); Comment, In Re San Juan Star: Discovery and the First Amendment, 34 BAY-
LOR L. REV. 229 (1982).
32. 98 Wash. 2d at 270-71, 654 P.2d at 697.
33. Id. at 274-75, 654 P.2d at 699.
34. Id. at 273, 654 P.2d at 698.
35. Id. at 274-75, 654 P.2d at 699. The second paragraph of the protective order
prevented the dissemination of financial and membership information, but the next par-
agraph broadened the scope of the protective order to include all information uncovered
through the discovery process. Id.
36. Id. at 275, 654 P.2d at 699-700.
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value of the doctrine in a proper context and neglects the pri-
mary duty of the court in this case: establishing the appropri-
ate standard by which trial courts may issue protective orders
without violating the requirements of the constitution.
That primary duty also was left unfulfilled by the United
States Supreme Court. The Court identified first amendment
interests in discovery when it affirmed the Rhinehart majority
opinion, but failed to issue the standard needed to protect those
interests. The uncertainty created by the Washington court's
opinion thus increased following the United States Supreme
Court's decision.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS IN PRETRIAL DISCOVERY:
RECOGNITION WITHOUT PROTECTION
A. The Scope of First Amendment Interests in Discovery
Orders
1. The Federal View Before Rhinehart
When the Washington Supreme Court considered
Rhinehart, it looked solely to the federal courts for guidance, a
source that was somewhat ambiguous. The traditional stance
had been that first amendment rights either are waived or are of
no concern during discovery.3 8 Recent reexaminations of discov-
ery orders had led several courts and commentators to conclude,
however, that protective orders have a limited impact on a liti-
gant's first amendment freedoms."
Although some categories of speech are exempted from first
amendment protection because they are without informative or
social value,4" discovery materials do not automatically fall
37. Id. at 261, 654 P.2d at 692-93.
38. Dore, supra note 31, at 10. See, e.g., Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536
F.2d 1001, 1006 (3d Cir. 1976) (parties and counsel, by taking advantage of discovery
processes, may implicitly waive their first amendment rights to disclose or disseminate
information obtained through those processes); International Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325
F.2d 403, 407 (2d Cir. 1963) (no doubt as to the constitutionality of a rule allowing a
federal court to forbid the publicizing, in advance of trial, of information obtained by
one party from another by use of the court's processes).
39. See Rhinehart, 98 Wash. 2d at 264, 654 P.2d at 694 (Utter, J., dissenting) and
cases cited therein.
40. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (citing Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)). Categories of speech exempted from first
amendment protection include: libelous falsehoods, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 340 (1974); obscenities, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); and "fighting
words," Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. at 572.
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within one of those categories.4" Not all discovery information
warrants public dissemination and full-fledged first amendment
protection. 42 A tension exists between the need to protect pri-
vacy and public interests in discovery materials,4 and that ten-
sion led to a recognition of limited first amendment interests in
In re Halkin" and in San Juan Star Co. v. Barcelo.
45
The Halkin court decided that first amendment rights are
present once discovery information is obtained, but added that
the strength of those rights depends on the nature of the infor-
mation.46 An order limiting publication of political speech or
court records evokes different interests than an order restraining
41. Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 93 F.R.D. 471, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The
Supreme Court agreed in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199 (1984), that it
is "clear that information obtained through civil discovery authorized by modern rules of
civil procedure would rarely, if ever, fall within the classes of unprotected speech identi-
fied by decisions of this Court." Id. at 2206.
42. See WASH. SUPER. CT. C.R. 26(c), supra note 13.
43. One commentator described the tension as follows:
[T]he courts have on various occasions upheld a right of access to information
of great public concern, especially when the government is involved. Further-
more, civil litigation often involves important social issues that seldom or never
arise in criminal proceedings. In some instances, civil actions are brought solely
for the purpose of gaining information for the public or to expose a need for
governmental action or correction. The public has a strong interest in observ-
ing such proceedings. Because of the perishable quality of such information,
even a temporary suppression can result in irreparable harm.
Comment, supra note 31, at 242 (footnotes omitted). Another court saw less need to
justify public access to discovery materials. "As a general proposition, pretrial discovery
must take place in the public unless compelling reasons exist for denying the public
access to the proceedings." American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594, 596 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979). Aside from the public's interest, litigants
may have an interest in publicizing discovery information. Note, supra note 15, at 1655.
A litigant has a first amendment right to discuss a lawsuit publicly, and public disclosure
of discovered information may be essential to effective litigation. Id. The litigant may
choose to publicize the case in order to solicit funds, and disclosure of discovered infor-
mation may be necessary to show the suit is grounded in fact rather than allegation. Id.
at 1655-56.
But see Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2207-08. The Court did not
say that discovery proceedings may never be made public, but found that "in general,
they are conducted in private as a matter of modern practice." The Court added that
restraints on discovered information are not a restriction on a traditionally public source
of information. Id. at 2208. The Court made no mention of situations in which discov-
ered information should be made public, as noted above.
44. 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See infra note 50 for the facts in Halkin.
45. 662 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1981). Appellants in San Juan Star challenged an order
prohibiting the attorneys in a civil rights suit from disclosing any deposition evidence to
the press, the litigants, or to any third party. The suit arose from the killings of two
suspected terrorists by Puerto Rican police.
46. 598 F.2d at 191.
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commercial information,47 and an order "protecting" highly
newsworthy information raises concerns different from a tempo-
rary restraint of materials having "constant but rarely topical
interest.'48 The Halkin court directed courts to determine first
whether a requested protective order would restrain information
and what the nature of that restraint would be." If the discov-
ery information was newsworthy or of public interest, the trial
court was to review the order with a test that balanced first
amendment interests against competing concerns.50
47. Id.
48. Id. These statements appear to show the acceptance of content-based regula-
tions of speech that the Supreme Court has directed courts to avoid. See Erznoznik v.
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). In Erznoznik, the Court concluded that a state or
municipality may protect individual privacy by enacting reasonable time, place, and
manner regulations applicable to all speech irrespective of content. "But when the gov-
ernment, acting as censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of
speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others, the First Amendment
strictly limits its power." Id. at 209. The Court cited Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92 (1972), as support for its stance against content-based regulations.
Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 209. In the passage referred to, the Court said, "[a]bove all else,
the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Mosley, 408 U.S. at
95.
The Court's disapproval of the government as censor was extended to the courts in
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). The Court refused to uphold a gag
order prohibiting publication of an accused's confessions in a highly publicized murder
trial. Justice Brennan commented that "the press may be arrogant, tyrannical, abusive,
and sensationalist, just as it may be incisive, probing, and informative. But at least in
the context of prior restraints on publication, the decision of what, when, and how to
publish is for editors, not judges." Id. at 613 (Brennan, J., concurring).
The Halkin court apparently accepted an editorial role for judges because pretrial
discovery information is obtained solely through the court's processes and because all
discovery information will not eventually be destined for public consumption. Such was
the court's position in San Juan Star. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. The
Rhinehart dissent also accepted the principle that first amendment interests will vary
according to the type of expression subject to the protective order. 98 Wash. 2d at 270,
654 P.2d at 697 (Utter, J., dissenting).
What all three opinions described, therefore, was not a radical departure from the
discretionary good cause standard. The opinions simply suggested the adoption of a
more carefully defined set of guidelines so that first amendment interests would receive
adequate attention where appropriate. The Rhinehart dissent criticized the majority
opinion because "it has not provided an analytical framework by which we as a reviewing
court will be able to differentiate this case from one in which the First Amendment
interest is more substantial." Id.
49. 598 F.2d at 191.
50. Id. The Halkin order did implicate first amendment interests. The plaintiffs in
Halkin sued the United States government for conducting unlawful surveillance pro-
grams against their anti-Vietnam War activities. When the United States sought a pro-
tective order to prevent disclosure of certain discovery materials, the Halkin court held
that the newsworthiness of the information mandated its disclosure. 598 F.2d at 197. The
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The San Juan Star court also determined that significant
but limited first amendment concerns are affected by pretrial
discovery protective orders.5 1 According to the court, first
amendment interests and the severity of a court's scrutiny of
restraints on dissemination differ in cases involving civil discov-
ery rather than public proceedings.2 Discovery information has
not passed the strict tests of relevance and admissibility that are
applied to trial evidence. The material revealed may be irrele-
vant or prejudicial, or may pose an undue invasion of an individ-
ual's privacy.5 3 "Such undigested matter, forced from the mouth
of an unwilling deponent, is hardly material encompassed within
a broad public 'right to know.' ,,5' The first amendment still
must be considered in weighing a protective order request, how-
ever, because of the order's impact on the individual interest in
self-expression and the concern that government not lightly
engage in restraints on communication.5 5 Some discovery infor-
mation will be relevant at trial, newsworthy, and therefore sub-
ject to greater attention under the first amendment.58
Because first amendment interests are viewed as limited in
discovery proceedings, most federal courts have stopped short of
analyzing protective orders as prior restraints. 7 Since the order
in San Juan Star touched on first amendment interests, the
court applied a standard of review similar to the prior restraints
standard, but less stringent because of the more limited first
government materials had been purged of sensitive and confidential information before
being given to the plaintiffs. 598 F.2d at 180.
51. 662 F.2d at 114. The Rhinehart dissent similarly assumed the presence of lim-
ited first amendment interests in discovery materials. 98 Wash. 2d at 266, 654 P.2d at
695 (Utter, J., dissenting). "[O]ne's interest in disseminating discovery materials is
restricted because it is obtained solely by virtue of the court's processes." Id. at 265, 654
P.2d at 694 (quoting Halkin, 598 F.2d at 206).
52. San Juan Star, 662 F.2d at 114.
53. Id. at 115.
54. Id. Similar reasoning was used to restrict the dissemination of trade secrets and
other confidential information in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529
F. Supp. 866 (E.D. Pa. 1981). The Zenith court noted that it was beyond dispute that
judicial proceedings and records are open to the public, but added that it was difficult to
determine what types of materials comprise judicial records. Id. at 895. The raw fruits of
discovery do not constitute judicial records because they are not in the court's possession
until introduced as evidence. The public has no common law right to inspect materials
produced in discovery but not placed in the custody of the court. Id. at 898 (citing Wilk
v. American Medical Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 n.7 (7th Cir. 1980)).
55. San Juan Star, 662 F.2d at 115.
56. Id.
57. Cf. supra note 27.
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amendment interests at stake. 8 Similarly, the Halkin court did
not view first amendment interests as sufficiently strong to war-
rant analysis of a protective order as a prior restraint.8 9
2. The Rhinehart Approach
The Washington Supreme Court did not adopt the reason-
ing of the Halkin and San Juan Star courts because it did not
regard their recognition of first amendment interests as man-
dated by previous United States Supreme Court decisions."0
However, the means of analysis with which the Washington
court examined the Rhinehart order contradicted the court's
reluctance to identify first amendment interests in pretrial
discovery.
The Rhinehart opinion began with a fundamental point: the
press is afforded no greater constitutional protection than is the
general public.6 The Rhinehart court thus established at the
outset that the Seattle Times would receive no special consider-
ation because of its position as both litigant and press represen-
tative.6 2 The clarity of that point faded, however, as the court
more closely examined the degree of constitutional protection
that the Times deserved in the Rhinehart litigation. The Times
claimed that the protective order acted as a prior restraint in
limiting the use to which the newspaper could put discovery
information.6 3 The majority did not believe the prior restraint
doctrine applicable, and added that it would not reach the prior
restraint issue because "even under the prior restraint doctrine
protective orders can be justified."" Thus began the court's
lengthy analysis of the Rhinehart protective order as a prior
restraint.6 The majority never expressly declared that first
58. San Juan Star, 662 F.2d at 116.
59. Halkin, 598 F.2d at 186.
60. Rhinehart, 98 Wash. 2d at 248, 654 P.2d at 685.
61. 98 Wash. 2d at 229-30, 654 P.2d at 676. See also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,
833 (1974); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 13 (1965).
62. The majority criticized a case in which defendants were given greater rights than
normal litigants because they were members of the press. 98 Wash. 2d at 245, 654 P.2d
at 684 (criticizing Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
Because the defendants represented the press, the Reliance court analyzed the protec-
tive order as a prior restraint. 428 F. Supp. at 204. One commentator found the Reliance
court "incorrect in its apparent belief that the press was entitled to special first amend-
ment considerations." Dore, supra note 31, at 11.
63. Rhinehart, 98 Wash. 2d at 230, 654 P.2d at 676.
64. Id. at 231, 654 P.2d at 676.
65. See Rhinehart, 98 Wash. 2d at 261, 654 P.2d at 692 (Utter, J., dissenting).
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amendment interests are affected when a protective order is
issued, but by analyzing the Rhinehart order as a prior restraint,
the court implicitly recognized strong first amendment interests
in CR 26(c) protective orders.
The court began its justification of the Rhinehart order by
reviewing the purposes of discovery rules and protective
orders."6 CR 26(c) was designed to ameliorate problems caused
by unlimited discovery proceedings.6 7 The majority found no
indication in the discovery rules or anywhere else that the pur-
poses of discovery include the dissemination of information to
the public. 8 The majority overlooked the fact that unless a pro-
tective order is issued, materials obtained in discovery may be
used by a party for any purpose, including dissemination to the
"While voicing adherence to the prior restraint doctrine, the majority's analysis [of a
protective order as a prior restraint] reflects more its initial skepticism as to the doc-
trine's application." Id. Justice Utter considered the prior restraint analysis inappropri-
ate, since only limited first amendment interests attach to the dissemination of discovery
materials. Id. at 263, 654 P.2d at 694.
66. 98 Wash. 2d at 231, 654 P.2d at 676-77. The pretrial discovery procedures in the
1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sought to put an end to the "sporting theory of
justice," whereby the result of a trial depended on luck and on counsel's skill and strat-
egy. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, at 18-19. "Under the [common law] philosophy
that a judicial proceeding was a battle of wits rather than a search for the truth, each
side was protected to a large extent against disclosure in his case." Id. at 14. The 1938
rules and subsequent revisions revealed a different philosophy: every party to a civil
action is entitled to pretrial disclosure of all relevant information in the possession of
any person, unless that information is privileged. Id. at 15. This broad disclosure has
three purposes. One is to narrow the issues in a trial, another is to obtain evidence for
use at trial, and the third is to reveal the existence of evidence that might be used at
trial. Id.
67. Protective orders are directed mainly at the use, rather than the acquisition, of
the information discovered. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, § 2001, at 15. In limiting
the use of discovery materials, Rule 26(c) protective orders serve a dual function: "[s]uch
orders are meant to protect the health and integrity of the discovery process, as much as
to protect the parties who participate in it." Rhinehart, 98 Wash. 2d at 231, 654 P.2d at
677.
68. 98 Wash. 2d at 235, 654 P.2d at 679. The court cited Chief Justice Burger's
concurrence in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), in support of that state-
ment. In Gannett, the Court upheld a trial court's closure of a pretrial suppression hear-
ing. Id. at 394. The Gannett Court's emphasis on fair trial concerns makes the case of
limited relevance to Rhinehart. In most civil cases, the possibility that publicity will
result in an unfair trial is not at issue. See Note, supra note 15, at 1661. "Very few civil
cases achieve the notoriety that attaches to sensational criminal trials." Id. Another com-
mentator adds that "[i]n effect, society tolerates greater imprecision in the protection of
rights in the civil context, and thus instances of prejudice that might cause concern in
criminal trials may be deemed insignificant in civil trials." Note, Trial Secrecy and the
First Amendment Right of Public Access to Judicial Proceedings, 91 HAav. L. REv.
1899, 1922 (1978).
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public.09 The majority also overlooked the following observation:
The fact that information is received through discovery ren-
ders it 'of public interest.' Discovery is part of a judicial pro-
ceeding; and public knowledge of the workings of the discovery
system and of the types of information subject to discovery
adds to an understanding of the judicial system. Moreover,
public scrutiny is thought to benefit the proceeding itself: fair-
ness is ensured, and efficiency and competency are improved.70
The majority concluded that the United States Supreme
Court protects legitimate publicity interests with first amend-
ment freedoms. 71 In Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson72 and
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe,73 the Supreme Court
abated publication restrictions because, according to the
Rhinehart court, each case concerned "the rights of advocacy,
and the dissemination of ideas, which lie at the core of First
Amendment protection. '74  Since Rhinehart did not involve
advocacy or abstract discussion, but "only the reporting of sup-
posed facts elicited in discovery," the court decided that the
information did not warrant first amendment protection. 5 This
supposed distinction between reporting facts and advocating
ideas does not withstand scrutiny. In both Near and Austin, as
in most instances where opinions are publicized, factual evi-
dence supported the positions advocated. Neither the newspaper
in Near nor the citizens in Austin advocated ideas without
reporting facts."8
69. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
70. Note, supra note 15, at 1655. See also Comment, supra note 31, at 242.
71. Rhinehart, 98 Wash. 2d at 248, 654 P.2d at 686.
72. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). A Minnesota law authorized abatement, as a public nui-
sance, of a malicious or scandalous newspaper. Id. at 701-02. When a local prosecutor
successfully brought an abatement action against a newspaper for criticizing law enforce-
ment officials, the Supreme Court set aside the state injunction as a prior restraint. Id. at
723.
73. 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
74. 98 Wash. 2d at 248-49, 654 P.2d at 686.
75. Id.
76. The majority's use of Austin is especially puzzling. In Austin, a real estate bro-
ker attempted to enjoin a community's distribution of pamphlets that criticized the bro-
ker's allegedly "block-busting" and "panic peddling" activities. 402 U.S. at 416. The
Supreme Court reversed the state court injunction, stating that "[d]esignating the con-
duct as an invasion of privacy . . . is not sufficient to support an injunction against
peaceful distribution of informational literature of the nature revealed by this record."
Id. at 419-20. The Supreme Court nowhere referred to the pamphlets, as did the
Rhinehart majority, as "racist in their content." 98 Wash. 2d at 248, 654 P.2d at 686.
The pamphlets contained facts, as would a Times article on Kevin Rhinehart. An addi-
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The Rhinehart court acknowledged that when matters of
public interest are of concern and privacy interests are not,
there may be good reason to deny a protective order and permit
discovery information to be publicized. 77 A protective order
should not issue, however, if the information to be published is
merely newsworthy.78 "It does not seem likely that, where a mat-
ter is considered newsworthy, the media will be without its own
means of examining the facts. ' '7 9 Even assuming that news-
worthiness is severable from public interest, the conclusion that
first amendment interests subside as newsworthiness increases is
questionable.8 0
The uncertainty with which the Washington court addres-
sed first amendment interests may have been one reason for the
pointed introduction to Justice Brennan's concurrence in Seat-
tle Times Co. v. Rhinehart.81 The Justice began his opinion with
this statement: "The Court today recognizes that pretrial pro-
tective orders . . . are subject to scrutiny under the First
tional point made in Austin further weakens its holding as support for the majority's
position in Rhinehart. Respondent's claim of an invasion of privacy was unwarranted
because he was "not attempting to stop the flow of information into his own household,
but to the public." Austin, 402 U.S. at 420. The same observation could be made in
Rhinehart.
77. 98 Wash. 2d at 254, 654 P.2d at 689.
78. Id. at 254-55, 654 P.2d at 689. The court was skeptical as to the newsworthiness
of the material on the Aquarian Foundation. "We are not told what interest of the public
is served by the newspaper's further exposure of this allegedly religious sect, unorthodox
though it undoubtedly is, but we assume that publishers could rightly find it news-
worthy." Id. at 255, 654 P.2d at 689. The United States Supreme Court was less skepti-
cal: "In this case, as petitioners argue, there certainly is a public interest in knowing
more about respondents." Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2206 (1984).
79. Rhinehart, 98 Wash. 2d at 254-55, 654 P.2d at 689. The Supreme Court adopted
the same line of reasoning, and held that the protective order was not a prior restraint
because the Times could use outside means to uncover the desired information. Seattle
Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2208 (1984). Two problems arise with this rea-
soning. The first focuses on how a court is to determine, when a subsequent article
includes the protected information, whether that information was produced through
legitimate investigation or by violating the protective order. A newspaper may be forced
to restrict its discussion of the litigation to avoid being charged with violating a protec-
tive order. The second problem arises when a party is not a member of the press. How
else will that party get information than through the discovery process? In a case such as
Rhinehart, the restriction of information may be more beneficial than harmful. In a case
such as Halkin, however, private citizens could be unfairly restrained from releasing
information of legitimate public interest.
80. The Halkin court and the San Juan Star court both specified that newsworthy
information deserved first amendment protection. Halkin, 598 F.2d at 191; San Juan
Star, 662 F.2d at 115.
81. 104 S. Ct. 2199 (1984).
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Amendment. ' '82
3. Resolution by the Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the conflict presented by Rhinehart, Halkin, and San
Juan Star.83 Though the Court affirmed the Rhinehart court's
holding, it did not affirm the rationale for that holding. In recog-
nizing the presence of limited first amendment interests in dis-
seminating discovery information,84 the Court followed more
closely the analysis used by the federal circuits.
In words reminiscent of Halkin and San Juan Star, the
Court stated that judicial limitations on a litigant's ability to
disseminate discovery information compromise the first amend-
ment rights of the restricted party to a far lesser extent than
would restraints on dissemination of information in a different
context.85 Petitioners gain the information they wish to dissemi-
nate only by virtue of the trial court's discovery processes. 8
Since discovery is not a traditionally public component of a civil
trial, restraints placed on discovered but unadmitted informa-
tion are not restraints of traditionally public information.87 Fur-
thermore, since the limitations imposed by a protective order
pertain only to information produced via pretrial discovery, a
protective order is not the kind of classic prior restraint that
requires exacting first amendment scrutiny.88 A party is free to
distribute the same information covered by a protective order if
that information is derived independently of the court's
processes. 8 The Supreme Court concluded that protective
orders occupy a unique position in relation to the first amend-
ment:90 a determination that discovery information is not a
totally unprotected category of speech 91 does not mean that a
litigant has an unrestrained right to distribute discovery
information. 2
82. Id. at 2210 (Brennan, J., concurring).
83. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2205 (1984).
84. Id. at 2207.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2207-08.
88. Id. at 2208.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2206-07.
92. Id. at 2207.
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The Supreme Court thus identified the presence of limited
first amendment interests in disseminating discovery informa-
tion in much the same manner as had the Halkin and San Juan
Star courts." The Court echoed the circuit courts' refusal to
characterize a protective order as a traditional prior restraint
because of the limited first amendment interests involved.Y
Unfortunately, however, the Supreme Court stopped short of
adopting the standards set forth by Halkin and San Juan Star
for protecting first amendment interests during pretrial discov-
ery. As the following discussion shows, the Supreme Court broke
ranks with the circuit courts and more closely aligned itself with
the Washington Supreme Court in discussing the standard of
review that a trial court should use in evaluating a protective
order request. The Court failed to adopt the more definitive
standards proposed by the federal circuit courts.
B. The Standard of Review
1. The Federal Balancing Test
In conjunction with their recognition of first amendment
interests in discovery proceedings, the federal circuit courts
applied a standard of review that is more closely defined than
the discretionary good cause standard contained in rule 26(c).
95
Most of these courts did not condemn the good cause standard
but took care to outline the specific considerations that the stan-
dard should contain. Under the good cause standard as tradi-
tionally applied, a trial court employs only its discretion in
deciding whether to consider first amendment interests in evalu-
ating a protective order request.96 The trial court's discretion is
more limited when a balancing test is used, and thus first
amendment interests are given greater protection. 7
The Halkin court developed a three-part balancing test for
evaluating a protective order request: the harm posed by dissem-
ination must be substantial and serious; the restraining order
must be narrowly drawn and precise; and there must be no alter-
93. See supra notes 44-59 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
95. An exception is the decision in Koster v. Chase Manhatten Bank, 93 F.R.D. 471
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), in which the court carefully outlined the various balancing tests but
refused to select one because the order involved did not meet the requirements of good
cause. Id. at 479-80.
96. Id. at 479.
97. Id. at 480.
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native means of protecting the public interest that intrudes less
directly on expression." The court acknowledged that a smooth-
ly operating system of discovery is in the interest of litigants and
society as a whole, since discovery contributes to the full airing
of material facts in controversy.9 9 Protecting the fairness of the
judicial system also is an important interest, though a defend-
ant's right to a fair trial receives more protection in criminal
than in civil proceedings. 100 The balancing test undermines
neither interest, but requires a court to demand "a particular
and specific demonstration of fact," rather than "stereotyped
and conclusory statements."10 1 An order restraining speech can-
not be based on a record that merely speculates that the right to
a fair trial might be jeopardized.
10 2
Although the San Juan Star court agreed that competing
interests must be clearly articulated, it suggested a more relaxed
standard for examining protective orders. 03 The San Juan Star
decision advised courts to evaluate the magnitude and immi-
nence of the threatened harm, the effectiveness of the protective
order in preventing the harm, the availability of less restrictive
means of doing so, and the narrowness of the order if one were
deemed necessary.. 4 The court proposed a good cause standard
incorporating a heightened sensitivity to the first amendment
interests at stake.'
The balancing tests proposed by the federal circuits vary in
wording, but each compels a trial court to define carefully the
competing interests involved and to give special attention to
first amendment interests before issuing a protective order. The
first amendment interest implicated by a protective order
request varies according to the type of information discovered,
so no simple rule applies in all cases. 0 6 These balancing guide-
lines, therefore, do not remove a trial court's discretionary
authority in issuing protective orders. Instead, they seek to
retain that authority while ensuring that a litigant's first amend-
ment interests are recognized and protected.
98. 598 F.2d at 191.
99. Id. at 192.
100. Id. at 192-93. See also supra note 68.
101. Id. at 193 (quoting WRIGHT & MLLER, supra note 12, § 2035, at 265).
102. 598 F.2d at 193.
103. 662 F.2d 108, 116 (1st Cir. 1981).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Rhinehart, 98 Wash. 2d at 271-72, 654 P.2d at 698 (Utter, J., dissenting).
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2. The State Supreme Court's Standard of Review
The Rhinehart majority stated that rule 26(c) "has gener-
ally been given effect according to the import of its words." '
"The issuance of protective orders is within the discretion of the
trial court, to be granted where, in its judgment, good cause
exists ... .o While the court acknowledged that some federal
courts had not adopted a literal interpretation of the good cause
standard, it dismissed the balancing tests proposed as "unduly
complex and onerous."109 By adopting the prior restraint stan-
dard of review, however, the Rhinehart majority adopted a far
more onerous standard than any balancing test.110
The majority sought to justify the protective order as a
prior restraint by showing the need to protect privacy interests
and to ensure effective judicial administration. The court cited
tort law, state statutes, and Supreme Court cases to illustrate,
the increasing awareness that privacy rights must be pro-
tected."' The court's discussion of privacy interests ended in a
dire prediction. If protective orders could not be issued to pro-
tect such interests, the result would be a "serious undermining
of the morale of the people as well as the integrity of the govern-
ment.""' 2 The majority thus viewed Rhinehart in disjunctive
terms: either privacy rights were supreme or protective orders
were useless. Few supporters of the first amendment balancing
test have denigrated privacy interests. Rather, they have shown
that other rights, including those protected by the first amend-
ment, may be as important as, or more important than, the pri-
107. Id. at 234, 654 P.2d at 678.
108. Id. at 234-35, 654 P.2d at 678.
109. Id. at 248, 654 P.2d at 685. Another commentator viewed the Halkin criteria
quite differently, stating that the proposed balancing test clarified the previously uncer-
tain good cause standard. "In the past, courts have been unable to develop a workable
standard of good cause for issuing protective orders prohibiting dissemination. . . . The
Halkin test is an excellent formulation of the good cause standard that properly
accounts for the constitutional right to disseminate discovery information." Note, Pro-
tective Orders Prohibiting Dissemination of Discovery Information: The First Amend-
ment and Good Cause, 1980 DUKE L.J. 766, 799 (1980).
110. Justice Utter stated:
The inconsistency of the majority's approach is made evident by its treatment
of Halkin and San Juan Star. The majority states the standards articulated by
those courts are not mandated by the constitution. . . . Yet the standards
developed in both cases are less stringent than the heavy presumption against
validity, which the majority purports to apply in dispensing with this case.
98 Wash. 2d at 267 n.13, 654 P.2d at 695 n.4 (Utter, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 236-42, 654 P.2d at 680-83.
112. Id. at 238, 654 P.2d at 680.
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vacy interests in a case. 18
The other justification offered for the protective order as
prior restraint was the need for effective judicial administration.
The Rhinehart majority criticized the balancing tests offered by
the federal circuits, finding that they "tend to undermine the
objectives of pretrial discovery, which is designed to expedite
rather than hinder the process of litigation."'114 Few of the bal-
ancing tests offered have overlooked the needs of judicial admin-
istration.10 The Rhinehart dissent recognized that "the court
has legitimate concerns in administering the discovery process,
which may affect the extent to which First Amendment expres-
sion remains unimpaired."' 10 The need that overrides all others,
however, is the need to identify the interests implicated by a
protective order request. Those interests will include, not
exclude, administrative needs. In some cases such needs will
override the first amendment interests at stake, and in some
they will not. The balancing guidelines guarantee that all inter-
ests are considered rather than undermined.
The Rhinehart majority's discussion of cases dealing with
first amendment rights in judicial proceedings'1 7 continued to
circle the issue that the balancing tests confront. The majority
concluded that "the [United States Supreme] Court's concern
for the protection of First Amendment rights, at least insofar as
access to governmental processes is concerned, increases in pro-
portion to the intensity of the legitimate interest which the pub-
lic has in learning about those processes.""' 8 The real issue in
Rhinehart, however, was just how the legitimacy of that public
interest should be determined. A trial court should not be
113. See Rhinehart, 98 Wash. 2d at 271, 654 P.2d at 697 (Utter, J., dissenting); San
Juan Star Co. v. Barcelo, 662 F.2d 108, 115 (1st Cir. 1981); In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176,
190-91 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200, 204-05 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Note, supra note 15, at 1656-57, 1662-63; Dore, supra note 31, at 15-17; Comment,
supra note 31, at 243-45; Note, supra note 109, at 791-94.
114. 98 Wash. 2d at 248, 654 P.2d at 685.
115. Both In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979) and San Juan Star Co. v.
Barcelo, 662 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1981) recognized the need for smoothly functioning dis-
covery proceedings, and neither saw a balancing test as an interruption of such processes.
Halkin, 598 F.2d at 192; San Juan Star, 662 F.2d at 116.
116. 98 Wash. 2d at 268, 654 P.2d at 696 (Utter, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 250, 654 P.2d at 686-87 (discussing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)); 98 Wash. 2d at 249, 251, 654 P.2d at 686-87 (discussing
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978)); 98 Wash. 2d at 249,
654 P.2d at 686 (discussing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)).
118. 98 Wash. 2d at 250, 654 P.2d at 687.
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directed simply to use its discretion in deciding whether the
public interest in access is legitimate. A balancing test with spe-
cific guidelines for administration ensures a more complete con-
sideration and protection of each interest involved in a protec-
tive order decision. Even if the Rhinehart information was not
deserving of strong first amendment protection, the Washington
Supreme Court should have proposed guidelines for trial courts
to use in cases where the first amendment concerns were more
substantial.
The Rhinehart court held that the good cause standard
required a limited balancing test in which a trial court weighs
the interests of the parties to determine whether a protective
order is needed or appropriate. The Rhinehart court insisted,
however, that the trial court's major concern is the "facilitation
of the discovery process and the protection of the integrity of
that process," which involves considering the parties' privacy
interests and does not condone publicity. 19 Even assuming that
a protective order is a prior restraint of free expression, the
Rhinehart majority concluded that the interest of the judiciary
in the integrity of the discovery processes met the "heavy bur-
den" of justifying a prior restraint.120
In avoiding any real consideration of the tests described as
onerous and complex, the Rhinehart majority offered a substi-
tute that is logically weak and without clear-cut guidelines.
When the Times appealed the state court's decision, the United
States Supreme Court only partially clarified the considerations
to be weighed in reviewing a protective order request.
119. Id. at 256, 654 P.2d at 690.
120. Id. The Rhinehart court's treatment of the prior restraint doctrine is difficult
to explain. The United States Supreme Court views prior restraints with special disfavor,
and has, so far, placed constitutional barriers against such restraints that are almost
impossible to overcome. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1505, 1517 (10th ed. 1980). The chief purpose of the guarantee of a free press is to pre-
vent prior restraints on publication. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713
(1931). "[L]iberty of the press, historically considered and taken up by the Federal Con-
stitution, has meant, principally although not exclusively, immunity from previous
restraints, or censorship." Id. at 716.
In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199 (1984), the Supreme Court was
careful to note that a protective order is not the type of classic prior restraint that
requires exacting first amendment scrutiny. Id. at 2208. Since a protective order only
restrains a litigant from using information obtained through pretrial discovery, such
orders implicate the first amendment rights of the restricted party to a far lesser extent
than would restraints on dissemination in a different context. Id.
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3. The United States Supreme Court's Standard
Even though the Supreme Court recognized first amend-
ment interests in pretrial discovery, it declined to use the
Rhinehart case as an opportunity to outline balancing criteria
that would protect such interests.1 2 1 The Court did employ a
limited balancing test, however, to determine the scope of a liti-
gant's first amendment rights to disseminate discovery informa-
tion.12 2 In making that determination, the Court found it neces-
sary to consider whether the "practice in question [furthers] an
important or substantial government interest unrelated to the
suppression of expression" and whether "the limitation of First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is necessary or essential
to the protection of the government interests involved."' 23
The Supreme Court found that CR 26(c) furthers the sub-
stantial government interest of assisting litigants in acquiring
information helpful to their case, 2 " but also found that the rule
makes it possible for a litigant to obtain information that could
be damaging to the opposing party's reputation and privacy if
released. 26 The Court stated that "the government clearly has a
substantial interest in preventing this sort of abuse of its
processes 1 26 and concluded that prevention of such abuse was
sufficient justification for the authorization of protective
orders. 2 17
The Court reached this conclusion without an express refer-
ence to the second half of its balancing test: whether the limita-
tion of first amendment interests is no greater than necessary.
28
This is just the oversight that the balancing tests proposed by
Halkin and San Juan Star-and by the Rhinehart dis-
sent-sought to cure. Well-defined balancing guidelines would
ensure a limitation of first amendment freedoms no greater than
necessary to protect the discovery process.
The Supreme Court recognized that CR 26(c) confers broad
discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order is
121. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2206 (1984).
122. Id. at 2207.
123. Id. (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974)).
124. 104 S. Ct. at 2208.
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appropriate, but concluded that such discretion was proper. 29
"The trial court is in the best position to weigh fairly the com-
peting needs and interests of parties affected by discovery.
130
The Court concluded that Rhinehart's rights to privacy and reli-
gious freedom outweighed the Times' first amendment interests
in publicizing the protected information. 3' The United States
Supreme Court basically followed the reasoning of Halkin and
San Juan Star until the question of a well-defined balancing
test arose. At that point, the Court unfortunately adopted the
conclusion reached, if not the rationale employed, by the state
supreme court in Rhinehart.
IV. WASHINGTON GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATING CR 26(c)
PROTECTIVE ORDERS
The Washington Supreme Court has held several times that
the state constitution's free speech guarantees must be balanced
against interests in privacy and effective judicial administra-
tion. 1 2 The court also has balanced such interests against the
constitution's protection of open judicial proceedings. 33 Several
cases dealing with access to governmental records similarly have
balanced rights of free speech against privacy interests.'3 While
none of these cases deal with discovery proceedings or protective
orders, they show an ability and a willingness to balance consti-
tutional rights that should have been applied in Rhinehart.
A. Article I, Sections 5 and 10: A Balancing Mandate
Article I, section 5 of the Washington Constitution provides
that "[elvery person may freely speak, write and publish on all
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2209-10 (Brennan, J., concurring).
132. See infra note 138.
133. See infra note 138.
134. See Seattle Times Co. v. County of Benton, 99 Wash. 2d 251, 661 P.2d 964
(1983) (reporter's right of access to confidential juvenile court files must be weighed
against family's interest in anonymity); Cowles Publishing Co. v. Murphy, 96 Wash. 2d
584, 637 P.2d 966 (1981) (public interest in certain court records must be weighed
against interests in effective law enforcement and individual privacy and safety); Cohen
v. Everett City Council, 85 Wash. 2d 385, 535 P.2d 801 (1975) (reporter's interest in trial
transcript must be weighed against court's reasons for secret adjudication); In re Sage,
21 Wash. App. 803, 586 P.2d 1201 (1978) (adoptee's interest in learning identity of natu-
ral parents must be weighed against policy in favor of keeping adoption records sealed).
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subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right."1 " This
section has been interpreted in conjunction with article I, sec-
tion 10, which provides that "[j]ustice in all cases shall be
administered openly and without unnecessary delay."13 6 Rarely
has either provision been given its "plain meaning"1 37 when the
interests they protect conflict with other rights.58 Washington
135. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5.
136. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10. Cases interpreting both sections 5 and 10 include
Federated Publications, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d 51, 615 P.2d 440 (1980) (right of press
to attend and publish information revealed in pretrial suppression hearing balanced
against defendant's right to fair trial) and State ex rel. Superior Court v. Sperry, 79
Wash. 2d 69, 483 P.2d 608 (right of press to publish information learned in court pro-
ceeding balanced against court's interests in ensuring fair trial), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
939 (1971), modified, State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 364, 679 P.2d 353 (1984).
137. The Georgia Supreme Court gave a state constitutional provision its plain
meaning in Georgia Gazette Publishing Co. v. Ramsey, 248 Ga. 528, 284 S.E.2d 386
(1981). The court held that the "free press" provision mandated the rejection of a pro-
tective order and that application of a balancing test was unnecessary. Id. at 529-30, 284
S.E.2d at 387. The protective order was an unwarranted restraint upon the defendant
newspaper's liberties of speech and press. Id.
Such state constitutional provisions rarely are interpreted literally. Justice Frank-
furter stated in a concurrence to Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946), that "[tihe
State constitutions make it clear that the freedom of speech and press they guarantee is
not absolute." Id. at 356 n.5. Most of the constitutions "explicitly provide in practically
identical language for the right to speak, write and publish freely, every one, however,
'being responsible for the abuse of that right.'" Id. The Georgia constitution contains
such a provision. Id.
But see State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 364, 679 P.2d 353 (1984): "(Wash.] Const. art. I,
§ 5 guarantees an absolute right to publish and broadcast accurate, lawfully obtained
information that is a matter of public record by virtue of having been admitted into
evidence and presented in open court." Id. at 378, 679 P.2d at 361.
138. Article I, section 5 cases include Federated Publications, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94
Wash. 2d 51, 615 P.2d 440 (1980); State v. Conifer Enters., Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 94, 508
P.2d 149 (1973) (only compelling state interest in regulation of subject within state's
constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting free expression); City of Seattle v.
Bittner, 81 Wash. 2d 747, 505 P.2d 126 (1973) (not all prior restraint of free expression is
forbidden; narrow restraint with procedural safeguards would be permissible); State ex
rel. Superior Court v. Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69, 483 P.2d 608, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939
(1971), modified, State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 364, 679 P.2d 353 (1984); Fine Arts Guild,
Inc. v. City of Seattle, 74 Wash. 2d 503, 445 P.2d 602 (1968) (right of free speech bal-
anced against city's right to regulate movies); Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73
Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968) (public's right to enjoy highways free of billboards
outweighs free speech interest claimed by advertising company), appeal dismissed, 393
U.S. 316 (1969); Johnston v. Beneficial Management Corp. of America, 26 Wash. App.
671, 614 P.2d 661 (1980) (free speech right of counsel to communicate with potential
class members balanced against parties' right to fair trial), rev'd on other grounds, 96
Wash. 2d 708, 638 P.2d 1201 (1982).
Article I, section 10 cases include Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d 30, 640
P.2d 716 (1982) (right of press to publish information contained in court record weighed
against need to protect defendant's interests); Federated Publications, Inc. v. Swedberg,
96 Wash. 2d 13, 633 P.2d 74 (1981) (right of press to attend pretrial hearings balanced
146 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 8:123
courts often have balanced article I guarantees against a defend-
ant's right to a fair trial and the interest in effective judicial
administration.1 89
Even though the cases interpreting the Washington Consti-
tution do not concern discovery proceedings or protective orders,
they are relevant to the issues in Rhinehart. The needs of public
access and free speech may be less significant in civil discovery
than in other judicial proceedings, but this does not mean that
such needs are of no consequence when a protective order is
requested. The Rhinehart majority stated that such orders may
be unwarranted when privacy interests are absent.140 Use of a
balancing test requires a court to examine the presence and
importance of various interests in a case. Even if interests in
public access are outweighed by privacy interests, articulation of
those interests helps to ensure that protective orders are issued
only when appropriate.
In Federated Publications, Inc. v. Kurtz, the Washington
Supreme Court relied on article I, sections 5 and 10 to establish
standards for closing a pretrial suppression hearing.' The court
against defendant's right to fair trial), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984 (1982); Cohen v. Ever-
ett City Council, 85 Wash. 2d 385, 535 P.2d 801 (1975) (reporter's interest in trial tran-
script must be weighed against court's reasons for secret adjudication); State ex rel.
Lewis v. Superior Court, 51 Wash. 2d 193, 316 P.2d 907 (1957) (right to open proceedings
weighed against juvenile defendant's right to anonymity); State v. Collins, 50 Wash. 2d
740, 314 P.2d 660 (1957) (right to public trial weighed against court's right to limit dis-
turbances of trial proceedings); State v. Malone, 20 Wash. App. 712, 582 P.2d 883 (1978)
(defendant's right to public trial balanced against court's right to regulate conduct of
parties at trial).
139. See supra note 138. The court also has balanced article I, section 5 rights
against other interests in contexts other than judicial proceedings. In Fine Arts Guild,
Inc. v. City of Seattle, 74 Wash. 2d 503, 445 P.2d 602 (1968), the court balanced the right
of free speech against a city's right to regulate movies. The court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the regulating ordinance. Id. at 513, 445 P.2d at 608. Although "any restraint
imposed upon a constitutionally protected medium of expression comes into court bear-
ing a heavy presumption against its constitutionality," id. at 506, 445 P.2d at 604
(emphasis supplied by court), prior restraints are not forbidden by article I, section 5. Id.
at 512, 445 P.2d at 608. The freedoms of speech and press are not absolute in Washing-
ton; the presence of those rights requires courts to engage in a first amendment balanc-
ing test. Id. at 513, 445 P.2d at 608.
140. 98 Wash. 2d at 254, 654 P.2d at 689.
141. 94 Wash. 2d 51, 615 P.2d 440 (1980), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984 (1982). In
Kurtz, a newspaper sought relief from an order barring the press and public from a
pretrial suppression hearing. The court preferred to resolve Kurtz under the Washington
State Constitution because of significant textual differences between the Washington
and United States constitutions regarding open judicial proceedings. Id. at 56, 615 P.2d
at 443. "Since the Washington Constitution provides more specific guidance on the mat-
ter of open proceedings it simplifies our task." Id. at 57, 615 P.2d at 443. The court
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held that a "substantial difference" exists between the right to
publish already acquired information and the right to attend a
proceeding for the purpose of news gathering.'42 Article I, sec-
tion 5 protects the former but confers no right to the latter.'4 3
The Rhinehart court did not apply this rule when it decided
that free speech guarantees did not affect the order prohibiting
the Seattle Times from publishing already acquired information.
The Kurtz court also found that article I, section 10 is not
limited to trials "but includes all judicial proceedings."' The
public's right to attend open proceedings is not absolute; stan-
dards must guide courts in deciding when exceptional circum-
stances mandate closure.'4 5 "[Tihe court needs workable stan-
dards that allow it to strike a balance between the public's right
of access and the accused's rights to a fair trial. .... ,1"" To jus-
tify closure the accused must show, and the court must balance,
the following factors: The likelihood of jeopardy to the accused's
constitutional rights from an open judicial proceeding; the
opportunity for anyone present to object to the closure; and the
lack of practical alternatives to closure that would protect the
accused's rights.1 47 The court generally should weigh the com-
peting interests of the defendant and the public and make a clo-
sure order no broader in application or duration than
necessary. 1"8
The Washington court thus applied in Kurtz a test resem-
bling the balancing tests it shunned in Rhinehart. Like the
Halkin and the San Juan Star guidelines, the Kurtz test
weighed the harm caused by disclosure against the rights of the
press and public. "9 The Kurtz court also looked to alternatives
added a note absent in Rhinehart: "[Sltate courts are the ultimate arbiters of state law,
unless a state court's interpretation restricts the liberties guaranteed the entire citizenry
under the federal constitution." Id. at 57, 615 P.2d at 443-44.
While Kurtz dealt with pretrial hearings, the decision supports the conclusion that
free speech interests are important in Rhinehart. In Kurtz, the press was not a party to
the litigation and had no special rights of access. A protective order appears much closer
to a restraint on free speech than does an order closing a pretrial hearing to third parties.
If the court saw free speech concerns implicated in Kurtz, it should have seen them
involved in Rhinehart's request for a protective order.
142. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d at 58, 615 P.2d at 444.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 59-60, 615 P.2d at 445.
145. Id. at 61, 615 P.2d at 445.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 62-63, 615 P.2d at 446.
148. Id. at 64-65, 615 P.2d at 447.
149. Id. at 64, 615 P.2d at 447.
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to a restriction on expression. 10 When none were found, the
court emphasized that the restrictive order had to be narrowly
drawn.1 51 Similar rules were stated in Halkin'52 and in San Juan
Star.153 Rather than leave the competing interests of public
access and fair trial solely to a trial court's discretion, Kurtz sug-
gested guidelines for courts to use in exercising their discretion-
ary authority. 54 Kurtz added that the interests of free speech
and public access are even stronger when a party is forbidden to
disclose information already obtained through judicial proceed-
ings.155 The Rhinehart majority could have acknowledged that
holding and modified the Kurtz test into guidelines applicable
to discovery orders.
The state supreme court extended the article I "open judi-
cial proceedings" provision to civil proceedings in Cohen v.
Everett City Council.156 The Cohen court expressly disagreed
with the contention that a right to a public trial exists only in
criminal proceedings.5 7 "This argument overlooks article 1, sec-
tion 10 of our state constitution which mandates that 'Justice in
150. Id. at 63, 615 P.2d at 446.
151. "The order must be no broader in its application or duration than necessary to
serve its purpose, which in this case was to protect the accused's right to a fair trial while
preserving the public's right to open proceedings." Id. at 64-65, 615 P.2d at 447.
152. 598 F.2d at 191.
153. 662 F.2d at 116. The Halkin and San Juan Star guidelines also were antici-
pated in State ex rel. Superior Court v. Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69, 483 P.2d 608, cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971), modified, State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 364, 679 P.2d 353
(1984). In Sperry, the supreme court refused to uphold a trial court order forbidding the
reporting of any court proceedings except those conducted in open court. Id. at 78, 483
P.2d at 613. When the jury was removed, the press reported on testimony made in the
jury's absence. Id. at 71, 483 P.2d at 609. The trial court held the press in contempt, but
the supreme court vacated that judgment. The Sperry court weighed the constitutional
rights of the press and public against those of the defendant, and concluded that the
trial court's effort to secure a fair trial wrongfully deprived the press of its constitutional
right to report what happened in open trial. Id. at 78, 483 P.2d at 613. "If restraints
upon the exercise of First Amendment rights are necessary to preserve the integrity of
the judicial process, then those restraints must be narrowly drawn." Id.
The Coe decision modified Sperry to provide even stronger support for article I,
section 5 interests. The Coe court stated that once information is admitted into evidence
and presented in open court, the right of the press to use it is absolute. 101 Wash. 2d at
378, 679 P.2d at 361. "To the extent that any of the language in Sperry suggests that
this right is not absolute, it is modified to conform with this opinion." Id. If free speech
rights are absolute when information is presented in open court, the need for a clearly
defined balancing test to protect such rights before trial appears even greater following
the Coe decision.
154. 94 Wash. 2d at 62-65, 615 P.2d at 446-47.
155. Id. at 58, 615 P.2d at 444.
156. 85 Wash. 2d 385, 535 P.2d 801 (1975).
157. Id. at 388, 535 P.2d at 803.
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all cases shall be administered openly. .. .' This separate, clear
and specific provision entitles the public [and the press] to
openly administered justice.
15 8
The Cohen decision is relevant to Rhinehart despite its
emphasis on trial proceedings. The Washington Supreme Court
has held that criminal pretrial proceedings are subject to the
open judicial proceedings guarantee.' 59 Given these precedents,
the next logical step would be to include civil pretrial proceed-
ings within that scope of constitutional protection. Interests in
privacy may be greater than rights of access at the discovery
stage, but even the Rhinehart court acknowledged that the pub-
lic may have rights of access to certain kinds of information
158. Id. The supreme court in Cohen vacated an order sealing a court record follow-
ing a decision on the merits. Id. at 390, 535 P.2d at 804. The Cohen court recognized that
exceptional circumstances sometimes justify limitations on open proceedings, and
pointed to adoption and juvenile court proceedings as two such circumstances, id. at 388,
535 P.2d at 803, but held that the trial court's reasons for secret adjudication were not of
sufficient public importance to justify an exception to the requirement of article I, sec-
tion 10. Id. at 389, 535 P.2d at 803-04. The Cohen court was wary of having its findings
applied to different factual situations. The court carefully noted that "the issue before us
does not involve the power of the court to keep confidential its records prior to consider-
ing a matter on the merits." Id. at 387, 535 P.2d at 802-03. The trial court action must
have reached a stage where justice is being administered before the open proceedings
mandate applies. Id. at 388-89, 535 P.2d at 803. While the Rhinehart court might argue
that justice is not being administered in a discovery proceeding, the majority's constant
claims that disclosure of the discovery information would impair judicial administration
undermines any such argument.
159. The court applied article I, section 10 to pretrial proceedings in Federated
Publications, Inc. v. Swedberg, 96 Wash. 2d 13, 633 P.2d 74 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
984 (1982), when it examined a trial court order requiring members of the press to sign
the Bench-Bar-Press Guidelines before attending pretrial hearings in a highly publicized
criminal trial. The Bench-Bar-Press Guidelines are a set of principles that guide the
courts, lawyers, and court personnel, as well as the media, in protecting the rights of
litigants while preserving the freedoms of speech and press. They honor the right of the
news media to report what occurs in the course of criminal court proceedings. These
guidelines suggest the exercise of caution in reporting matters that may be damaging to
the right of an accused to a fair trial during pretrial proceedings, when the risk of violat-
ing the defendant's rights is greatest. Id. at 20-21, 633 P.2d at 77-78. The trial court's
order was upheld only after the Swedberg court considered many competing interests.
The Bench-Bar-Press Guidelines balanced the rights of the press against those of the
litigants. Id. at 20, 633 P.2d at 77. The trial court balanced the public's right to know
against the defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. at 21, 633 P.2d at 78. The supreme court
balanced the trial court's authority to control judicial proceedings against the needs of
public access and free press. Id. at 22, 633 P.2d at 78. Neither court assumed that intro-
duction of constitutional concerns produced an onerous set of guidelines. Invocation of
such concerns simply required a balancing of competing interests.
Another case considering pretrial proceedings in light of article I, section 10, is Seat-
tle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d 30, 640 P.2d 716 (1982). See infra notes 163-72
and accompanying text.
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revealed during discovery. 160 It is through clearly framed balanc-
ing tests that the appropriate interests are properly identified
and weighed against one another. Applying the Cohen guide-
lines,"' a trial court should be required to show that specific cir-
cumstances warrant the issuance of a protective order as an
exception to the open proceedings requirement.'
When pretrial proceedings were closed without a clear
rationale in Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa,"' the supreme
court's concerns anticipated those raised in the Rhinehart dis-
sent. The trial court closed a criminal pretrial hearing, sealed
the record of that proceeding, and refused to open the record to
the public.0 4 When the Times challenged that action, the court
turned to Kurtz to decide whether pretrial publicity would vio-
late a defendant's fair trial rights. 66 Since the trial court closed
the record to protect additional interests, the supreme court
broadened the Kurtz framework.6 6  The supreme court
demanded a greater showing of need when a party requested clo-
sure to protect interests other than fair trial rights. 67 Instead of
only a "likelihood of jeopardy," the supreme court required a
"serious and imminent threat to some other important inter-
160. 98 Wash. 2d at 254, 654 P.2d at 689.
161. See supra note 158.
162. "As a general proposition, pretrial discovery is public unless compelling reasons
exist for denying the public access to the proceedings." Rhinehart, 98 Wash. 2d at 264,
654 P.2d at 694 (Utter, J., dissenting). Cf. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct.
2199, 2207-08 (1984): "[Pjretrial depositions and interrogatories are not public compo-
nents of a civil trial." The Court added a footnote to this statement and acknowledged
that some jurisdictions, including Washington, require the filing of discovery materials as
public information. Id. at 2207 n.19. Since a trial court may order that discovery materi-
als not be filed or filed under seal, the court may control access to this source of public
information. Id.
163. 97 Wash. 2d 30, 640 P.2d 716 (1982).
164. Id. at 32, 640 P.2d at 717.
165. Id. at 37-39, 640 P.2d at 720-21.
166. In going beyond Kurtz, the Ishikawa court stated:
Closure and sealing in the present case was premised in part on the protection
of the defendant's fair trial rights, as in Kurtz. However, Judge Ishikawa
restricted public access to protect other interests here, too. Because we believe
that closure to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial should be treated
somewhat differently from closure based entirely on the protection of other
interests, we will expand upon the framework adopted in Kurtz to cover such
motions.
Id. at 36-37, 640 P.2d at 720.
167. Id. at 37-39, 640 P.2d at 720-21. "[Slince important constitutional interests
would be threatened by restricting public access . . . a higher threshold will be required
before court proceedings will be closed to protect other interests." Id. at 37, 640 P.2d at
720.
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est."' 6 "Because courts are presumptively open, the burden of
justification should rest on the parties seeking to infringe the
public's right.'"
That burden was not met in Ishikawa since the judge ini-
tially gave no reason for issuing the closure order. 170 The
supreme court found that it was "unclear to what extent the
[trial] court weighed the competing interests and the alternative
methods."'' Furthermore, since the order was worded very
broadly and was to last indefinitely, "[tihe judge erred in failing
to narrowly tailor the protective restriction on access to suit the
specific needs of this case."'17
In Ishikawa, the supreme court offered another set of guide-
lines to help trial courts resolve a conflict between constitutional
interests. 73 The Ishikawa case dealt with a pretrial hearing, bul
its guidelines appear applicable to pretrial discovery orders, par-
ticularly since the failings of the Ishikawa order were reflected
in Rhinehart. The Rhinehart order concerned interests other
than fair trial rights, but the plaintiff's showing of "serious and
imminent threat" was never demonstrated clearly. The trial
court judge in Rhinehart offered a rationale for the order, but
that rationale does not appear to be grounded in specifics any
more than was Judge Ishikawa's. Keith Rhinehart never said
that he would withdraw his suit; the trial court feared only a
hypothetical chilling effect on a litigant's right to sue.'" The
Rhinehart order also failed to meet the "narrowly tailored"
requirement set forth once again in Ishikawa. 75
The Rhinehart disavowal of free speech concerns is not con-
168. Id. at 37, 640 P.2d at 720.
169. Id. at 37-38, 640 P.2d at 720.
170. Id. at 39, 640 P.2d at 721. The judge did not inform petitioners of the interests
being protected until compelled to do so by the supreme court four months after closure
had been ordered. Id. at 40, 640 P.2d at 721.
171. Id. The trial court stated only that this was "an exceptional case under excep-
tional circumstances" and that none of the Kurtz alternatives applied. Id. at 40, 640
P.2d at 722. The supreme court concluded that these legal findings lacked factual sup-
port. Id. at 41, 640 P.2d at 722.
172. Id. at 42, 640 P.2d at 723. This need of a narrowly tailored restriction was
referred to in Kurtz, Halkin, and San Juan Star. See supra note 149 and accompanying
text. Sperry also made such a demand. See supra note 153. The supreme court ordered a
remand of the Ishikawa case because the absence of "critical factual findings" prevented
any meaningful review of Judge Ishikawa's order. Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 45, 640 P.2d
at 724.
173. See supra notes 166-69.
174. Rhinehart, 98 Wash. 2d at 273-74, 654 P.2d at 699 (Utter, J., dissenting).
175. See supra note 172.
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vincing given the Washington Supreme Court's recognition of
such interests in other realms of the judicial process. Moreover,
the federal circuits have recognized the interests of access, free
speech, and free press in FRCP 26(c) orders to the same degree
that the Washington Supreme Court has recognized those inter-
ests in other judicial proceedings. When the Rhinehart court
ignored state case law, it missed an opportunity to build upon
clear and relevant precedents in developing CR 26(c) standards.
A trial court faced with a protective order request should be
required to balance the rights of free speech and open judicial
proceedings against those of individual privacy and effective
judicial administration. If an order is issued, it must be sup-
ported by factual findings and be narrowly drawn.
The Cohen court mentioned another area of state law that
supports the wisdom of a balancing test. The next section ana-
lyzes common law and statutory provisions dealing with public
access to government records. These provisions offer additional
guidance for establishing standards to use in issuing and review-
ing CR 26(c) orders.
B. Open Judicial Records: The Common Law and the Public
Disclosure Act
The Public Disclosure Act'7 e requires state agencies to make
their records available for public inspection and copying.17 7 The
role of court records within the Act is uncertain, in part because
the Washington Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether a
trial court is a state agency. 78 The justices avoided the issue in
Cohen because the statute was not cited to the court.17 9 The
question was evaded a second time in Cowles Publishing Co. v.
Murphy'"0 because the common law solved the question of
access to judicial records.'
176. See supra note 10.
177. WASH. REv. CODE § 42.17.250 (1983).
178. See infra notes 179-80.
179. 85 Wash. 2d at 390, 535 P.2d at 804 ("The city does not address the threshold
question of whether a trial court is a state agency within the statute. However, we do not
reach that issue because, even if RCW 42.17.330 were applicable, it was not cited to the
court ... ").
180. 96 Wash. 2d 584, 637 P.2d 966 (1981).
181. The Cowles court cited its refusal in Cohen to determine whether the judicial
branch was a state agency under WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.17.250-.340.
We again reserve the question since it is not necessary under our rationale.
Since we find that under the common law we have the inherent authority to
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The common law presumption of open judicial records is
grounded in the belief that maximum public access to govern-
mental information gives the public the knowledge needed to
understand how government works and to evaluate government
officials. 1 2 The "informed public concept" usually is associated
with the legislative and executive branches of government, but
applies equally to the judicial branch. 83 Access to certain
records gives the public a chance to see how the judicial process
is conducted. Indiscriminate disclosure of all records, however,
could hamper or destroy the effectiveness of judicial processes.1 84
Aware of the need to weigh conflicting factors, the Cowles court
suggested a set of procedures for handling search warrants1 8 5
and concluded that "[t]he magistrate or judge must weigh the
competing interests involved with making the documents a mat-
ter of public record, and determine whether a substantial threat
exists to the interests of effective law enforcement, or individual
privacy and safety."' 6
Once again, the state supreme court established a balancing
test for evaluating public access to judicial records. As in Kurtz
control access to records such as these, we decline respondent's invitation to
apply the rationale of RCW 42.17 or constitutional law in resolving this issue.
Cowles, 96 Wash. 2d at 588, 637 P.2d at 969.
The issue in Cowles was whether search warrants, affidavits of probable cause, and
inventory lists pertaining thereto should be filed as a matter of record for public inspec-
tion. Id. at 585, 637 P.2d at 967. The documents were not public just because public
officials handled them. Id. at 587, 637 P.2d at 968. The Cowles court suggested three
criteria for determining the accessibility of such records. First: Does some substantive
legal provision grant the right of access? Second: Will public access benefit the legal
system? Third: Will access jeopardize any other interest? Id. at 587-88, 637 P.2d at 968.
The "substantive legal provision" that could grant access might come from statutory,
constitutional, or common law. Id. at 588, 637 P.2d at 968. Although the respondent
suggested application of the Public Disclosure Act, the Cowles court turned to common
law principles. Id. at 588, 637 P.2d at 969. The common law presumes the openness of
judicial records, though the public right of access may be limited by a judge's discretion.
Id. The court again recognized that trial judges need standards with which to guide their
use of discretion. Id. at 589, 637 P.2d at 969. Since case law was of little help, the Cowles
court turned to an examination of the public right of access. "In this way, we can deter-
mine how to strike the balance between the right of the public and the need for effective
law enforcement and individual privacy." Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 590, 637 P.2d at 969.
185. Id. at 590, 637 P.2d at 970. If no objection is made, an executed search warrant
and the records pertaining thereto should be filed. Interested parties may request that a
warrant not be filed. The objector to the filing must demonstrate that filing of the docu-
ments presents a substantial threat to a significant interest. Id.
186. Id.
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and Ishikawa, the supreme court saw a need to assist lower
courts in using their discretionary powers. The right of public
access was of sufficient importance to be weighed against the
rights of privacy and judicial administration.
Not all judicial records are regarded in the same light as the
Cowles search warrants. An appellate court held in In re Sage 87
that adoption records must remain sealed, even to an adult
adoptee, unless good cause is shown.188 Full disclosure of adop-
tion records is not mandated by the Public Disclosure Act.18 9
Juvenile records are also excluded from the mandate of the Pub-
lic Disclosure Act. Despite the need to protect juvenile defen-
dants, however, limited access to juvenile records is allowed by
section 13.50.010(8) of the Revised Code of Washington, which
permits access for legitimate research purposes. 9 A newspaper
reporter's research is legitimate under the statute.' 9'
Washington courts therefore have balanced competing legis-
lative and constitutional policies to determine the accessibility
of court records. Even though state statutes sanctioned confi-
dentiality in Sage, the court balanced competing interests and
offered a rationale for denying public access."' The Rhinehart
majority equated the "prior restraint" of a CR 26(c) order with
the exemptions in the Public Disclosure Act,19' but the restric-
tions on dissemination are not wholly comparable. The juve-
nile" 4 and adoption'" acts have lengthy legislative histories
187. 21 Wash. App. 803, 586 P.2d 1201 (1978).
188. Id. at 809, 586 P.2d at 1205. See supra note 158.
189. Sage, 21 Wash. App. at 811, 586 P.2d at 1206. The Public Disclosure Act,
WASH. REv. CODE ch. 42.17, yielded to the Washington State Adoption Act, WASH. REV.
CODE ch. 26.32, which embodies a policy of confidentiality rather than disclosure. Sage,
21 Wash. App. at 808-09, 586 P.2d at 1204-05. The Sage trial court attempted to accom-
modate the various conflicting interests but concluded that the plaintiff's desire to dis-
cover his natural parents' identity did not satisfy the "good cause" needed for disclosure.
Id. at 811, 586 P.2d at 1206. "The potential disruption and emotional distress which
could result from indiscrimihate disclosure outweigh Mr. Sage's request for information
regarding his 'roots.'" Id.
190. Seattle Times Co. v. County of Benton, 99 Wash. 2d 251, 253, 661 P.2d 964, 965
(1983).
191. Id. Since most criminal proceedings are public and open to the media, the
court may not deny access for legitimate research purposes if the anonymity of the par-
ties is preserved. Id. at 259, 661 P.2d at 968.
192. 21 Wash. App. at 811, 586 P.2d at 1206.
193. 98 Wash. 2d at 238, 654 P.2d at 680.
194. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 13.50 (1983) deals with the keeping and release of records
by juvenile justice or care agencies.
195. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 26.32 (1983) is the Adoption Act. Section 26.32.150 gov-
erns disclosure of adoption records.
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detailing the need to protect the privacy interests of easily iden-
tified and narrowly defined groups of people. Protective orders
have a much broader applicability. First amendment and public
access concerns are implicated to a far greater degree in discov-
ery than in adoption and juvenile proceedings, since civil discov-
ery information will more often be of legitimate public interest
than information from adoption or juvenile proceedings. The
court has balanced free speech and open access rights against
privacy concerns when considering adoption and juvenile
records, and it should certainly do so in considering discovery
materials.
Discovery materials fall between adoption records and
search warrants in the open access continuum. Some discovery
information clearly should not be publicized, but even the
Rhinehart court admitted that some should. 9 Standards appli-
cable to situations beyond Rhinehart are needed so that courts
may determine logically which records should be disclosed and
which kept confidential. The balancing tests applied to other
judicial records should be modified and applied to discovery
materials. Given the absence of statutory guidelines and the
lesser need for fair trial concerns in civil proceedings, the
Rhinehart court's willingness to limit access to pretrial discovery
information appears misplaced.
197
V. CONCLUSION: A WORKABLE STANDARD FOR CR 26(c)
PROTECTIVE ORDERS
The United States Supreme Court identified the role of first
amendment interests in pretrial discovery, but it did not clarify
the standards needed to protect such interests. Both the Wash-
ington and United States Supreme Courts should have offered
clear-cut balancing tests for courts to use in issuing pretrial dis-
covery protective orders. The Washington Supreme Court might
have done so had it turned to state rather than federal case law.
The Washington Supreme Court has balanced constitu-
tional rights against other interests in the past, and it should not
196. 98 Wash. 2d at 254, 654 P.2d at 689.
197. The Public Disclosure Act includes an exception to disclosure that could
strengthen that conclusion. WAsH. REv. CODE § 42.17.310(1)(j) (1983) exempts from dis-
closure any records that would not be available to another party under the rules of pre-
trial discovery. This exemption could be interpreted to mean that pretrial materials
made available to another party should fall under the directives of the Public Disclosure
Act.
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have avoided doing so in Rhinehart. The court's refusal to rec-
ognize free speech interests in restraining access to civil discov-
ery information is puzzling in light of its previous sensitivity
toward any infringement of free speech rights. The questions
posed by Justice Utter to determine the need for a protective
order are comparable to guidelines formerly established by the
Washington court. While these guidelines arose in different con-
texts, they were still applicable to the underlying issues in
Rhinehart: the state constitutional requirement of open judicial
proceedings, the state and federal provisions protecting the free-,
dom of speech and press, and the common and statutory law
presumptions of public access to judicial records.
Clear articulation of a balancing test would have better
served Rhinehart and future cases involving CR 26(c) orders.
Such a balancing test need not imply that first amendment free-
doms override all other rights. Protective orders are essential for
the smooth functioning of discovery, and the right to privacy is
an important consideration. A typical test for CR 26(c) orders
might weigh first amendment interests, the harm to be pre-
vented by a protective order, any harm that an order might
cause, and the interests of the court in issuing a protective
order.
The Washington Supreme Court has balanced multiple con-
cerns before without finding them onerous or complex. Had the
Rhinehart court turned to its own precedents, it could have suc-
ceeded in shaping clear criteria for issuing and evaluating CR
26(c) protective orders.
Carole J. Breitenbach
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